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BACK TO THE BASICS: WHY TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION ARE EFFECTIVE TODAY AND WHY
ZIPPO NEEDS TO Go
Pavan Mehrotra*
The exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper when someone has
directed minimum contacts at a specific forum. Business
conducted over the Internet complicates personal jurisdiction
considerations because the boundaries of where one's conduct
reaches are not always clear. In Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly
Hills, LLC, the Second Circuit held that business activities
directed toward a forum coupled with Web site transactions made
personal jurisdiction proper in the distant forum. Courts are
divided in the approach to be used to judge whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is proper; some say traditional principles of
personal jurisdiction are proper, while others support the sliding
scale test from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com. The Second
Circuit's opinion is valuable for its clear reasoning, for its use of
established principles in looking at the personal jurisdiction
question and for providing a model that other courts can replicate
in their jurisdictional analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet's popularity has risen rapidly in the past ten years,
with over 230 million online users in the United States alone.'
With its seemingly ubiquitous nature, Internet businesses are
capitalizing on the large customer base by conducting transactions
through their Web sites. A logical concern for courts is whether
they could exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who conducts
. J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2012. 1 would
like to thank my parents, Dr. Pankaj Mehrotra and Poonam Mehrotra, for their
support and guidance while writing this article.
' SuperPower: Visualising the Internet, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/technology/8552410.stm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
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business over the Internet based solely on the party's electronic
presence in a forum.2 In Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills,
LLC, the Second Circuit held that Web site transactions, when
combined with business activities directed towards the forum,
make the exercise of personal jurisdiction in New York proper.'
This decision thus clarifies the approach by which courts should
consider questions of personal jurisdiction.
In determining personal jurisdiction, tension exists between
traditional personal jurisdiction contacts which are based on one's
actual, physical location, and the personal contacts arising from
one's Internet activity. This tension arises because Internet
contacts are not based on traditional personal jurisdiction
principles such as sovereignty and territoriality.' In Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo DOT Com,' a federal district court proposed a sliding
scale test to determine when personal jurisdiction over Internet
businesses was proper.! The Zippo decision has been criticized by
many commentators as destabilizing the law of personal
jurisdiction in courts across the country.' The decision in Queen
Bee provides stability in personal jurisdiction by providing a clear
analytical framework that is easily replicated.
This Recent Development will open with a discussion of the
legal principles a court relies on in determining personal
jurisdiction as well as a particular test, the Zippo sliding scale,
applied to Internet businesses. Part III discusses the Second
2 See Instabook Corp. v. Instantpublisher.com, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (describing how the standard for assessing whether personal
jurisdiction is unclear, as many courts have adopted the Zippo test but its appeal
is not universal).
' 616 F.3d 158 (2d. Cir. 2010).
4 Id. at 165.
5 Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has
Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43
U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 560 (2009); Daniel V. Logue, If the International Shoe Fits,
Wear It: Applying Traditional Personal Jurisdiction Analysis to Cyberspace in
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (1997) (arguing that
cyberspace contacts do not "involve any contact with the physical world").
6 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
'Id. at 1124.
8 Dunham, supra note 5; infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Circuit's use of a traditional personal jurisdiction analysis to create
a clear test for personal jurisdiction of Internet businesses and
analyzes the Queen Bee test as the current model for analyzing
personal jurisdiction. Part V contrasts the two approaches and
shows how the court's analysis in Queen Bee is superior. Finally,
this Recent Development predicts the effects the Queen Bee test
will have on lawsuits involving Internet businesses and argues that,
in the rapidly growing arena of Internet businesses, such an
informative and illuminating decision is significant in providing
guidance to other courts.
II. RELEVANT LAW-DUE PROCESS IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Personal Jurisdiction Overview
One of the first questions a court must consider when analyzing
a federal question in a non-domiciliary case is whether it has
personal jurisdiction over the parties.' Without such jurisdiction,
the court does not have the authority to hear and rule on the matter
of law at issue. Thus, the proper determination of this threshold
question is extremely important to the larger judicial framework.
A traditional personal jurisdiction analysis begins with the
court applying the forum state's long-arm statuteo to determine if,
9 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-476 (1985)
(describing how, in a case where defendant corporation is suing two individuals
for breach of a franchise agreement, determining whether defendants had a
"substantial connection" with the forum state is an important first step in the
suit); see generally Genesis Ins. Co. v. Alfi, 425 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (S.D.
Ohio 2006) (describing the court beginning its decision with a personal
jurisdiction analysis in a diversity case).
10 Brian K. Epps, Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.: The Expansion of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Modern Age ofInternet Advertising, 32 GA. L. REv. 237, 245
(1997) (looking at a state long-arm statute to determine whether there is
authority to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); Id at 245
n.57 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 942-43 (6th ed. 1990) (defining long-arm
statutes as "various state legislative acts which provide for personal jurisdiction,
via substituted service of process, over persons or corporations which are
nonresidents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by
agent, or communicate with persons in the state, for limited purposes, in actions
which concern claims relating to the performance or execution of those
purposes")).
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under state law, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
proper." Next, the court must conduct a Due Process inquiry 2 by
determining whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the
forum 3 and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
court comports with reasonableness requirements. 4
1. The Minimum Contacts Inquiry
Under the Due Process inquiry, the court will first examine the
entirety of a defendant's contact with the forum state to determine
whether the party had sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum to make personal jurisdiction proper." Minimum contacts
serve the dual purpose of insulating the defendant from the burden
of litigating in an inconvenient forum and providing a check on
state power by ensuring that the State does not reach beyond the
limits imposed on it by a federal system of government. 6
" See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108-09
(1987) (describing the role of the long-arm statute's role in the personal
jurisdiction analysis: "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits the power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. '[The] constitutional touchstone' of the determination whether an
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process 'remains whether
the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum
State.' ") (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see generally Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490
F.3d 239, 244 (2d. Cir. 2007). Most long arm statutes provide for the exercise
of jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the federal Constitution. In
Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, the New York long arm statute
permits personal jurisdiction. 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d. Cir. 2010).
12 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 164.
13 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1979)) (explaining that purposeful availment
occurs when a defendant has such a connection with a forum that "he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there").
14 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316) ("To be
reasonable under the Due Process Clause means that the exercise of jurisdiction
does not 'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."').
15 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 164-65 (citing Grand River Enters. Six Nations,
Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2005) ("No single event or contact
connecting defendant to the forum state need be demonstrated ... )); Best Van
Lines, 490 F.3d at 242.
16 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 ; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72
(quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) ("The Due Process Clause protects an
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Within the minimum contacts inquiry, courts will consider
whether a defendant "purposefully availed" themselves of the
benefit of conducting business in the forum state." Purposeful
availment can be measured by the number of occasions that a party
reaches out to another.'" As the Supreme Court notes, a continuing
relationship is not necessary in order to find that a defendant
purposefully directs their activities at the forum.'9 For jurisdiction
to be proper, it is enough for a defendant to "deliver its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum state."20
When a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a forum,
they have met the Due Process requirements for personal
jurisdiction.2' The minimum contacts inquiry continues with a
determination of whether the court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction will stem from specific or general jurisdiction. A state
exercises specific jurisdiction over a defendant when it bases
personal jurisdiction in a case on the defendant's contacts with the
forum.22 General jurisdiction, on the other hand, is exercised on
the basis of the defendant's general business contacts; thus, the
individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a
forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or
relations."').
'7 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) ("The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the
defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.").
1" See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (contrasting purposeful
availment with a "mere awareness" that a product will enter a forum).
' Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
20 Id. (quoting World- Wide, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
21 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that when minimum contacts are met,
continuing with the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
22 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418
(1983). Specific jurisdiction is exercised when a court presides over a defendant
due to his contacts with the forum. Id. at 414.
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court can exercise its power in a case that is unrelated to those
general contacts.23
2. The Reasonableness Inquiry
The second prong of the Due Process analysis asks whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by the court is reasonable under
the specific facts of the case.24 In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super.
Ct. of Cal.,25 the Supreme Court held that courts must consider the
following five factors as part of its reasonableness inquiry: (1) the
burden on the defendant as a result of the exercise of jurisdiction;
(2) the forum state's interest in having the case decided there; (3)
the plaintiffs need to obtain convenient and effective assistance;
(4) the interstate judiciary's interest in reaching an adequate
resolution of the issue; and (5) the shared interests of the states
involved in advancing important societal goals.26 In assessing
reasonableness, Asahi held that a court should weigh the forum
state's interest in the case against the burden placed on the
defendant as a result of litigating in a distant forum.27 When a
plaintiff has made a threshold showing of a defendant's minimum
contacts, finding proper jurisdiction is favored unless the defendant
points to compelling reasons, by way of the Asahi factors, why
jurisdiction is unreasonable.28
B. Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Era
1. The Zippo Test
23 id. at 414-15.
24 See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (reasoning that whether personal jurisdiction
is reasonable can depend on subjecting a defendant to a suit away from its
principal place of business); Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463 (noting that a court wants
to ensure that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts such that jurisdiction
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
25 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
26 Id. at 113-14. In a discussion of the application of the Asahi factors, the
Second Circuit noted that the burden placed on the defendant must significantly
outweigh the interests of the forum state or the forum state must have a slight
interest in adjudicating the case; see A. 1. Trade Fin. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76,
83 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing an application of the Asahi factors).27 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
28 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1984).
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In 1997, as the Internet was quickly gaining popularity, the
court in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT CoM 29 established a sliding
scale for determining personal jurisdiction in cases involving
Internet business.30 In Zippo, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania faced the question of when business
conducted over the Internet subjected a defendant to the
jurisdiction of a forum at which his activities were directed.' To
answer this question, the court devised a sliding scale to measure
the "nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet."3 2  At one end of the scale is a
defendant that clearly conducted business over the Internet, with a
history of transactions and repeated transmission of files.3 The
other end of the spectrum implicates situations where a defendant
merely posted information on a Web site which is accessible to
users in other jurisdictions.34 In the middle of the scale exists Web
sites where a user can exchange information with the host
computer; at this intersection courts must investigate the level of
interactivity to determine whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is proper.35
2. Widespread Use
The Zippo sliding scale has been used by a number of courts
across the country to determine whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is proper in the Internet commerce context. 6 A recent
29 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
30 Id. at 1124.
31 Id. at 1123.
32 Id. at 1124 ("Nevertheless, our review of the available cases and materials
reveals that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.").
3 Id.
34 Id. (explaining how such passive Web sites cannot be grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction because they merely make information
available).
35 Id. The middle part of the scale is where the difficult questions arise and,
indeed, where much of the in-depth analysis takes place. Dunham, supra note 5,
at 572.
36 See generally Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 252 (2d Cir.
2007) (indicating that several federal district courts in New York have applied
FALL 2010] 235
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decision by a federal district court in Michigan, Caldwell v.
Cheapcaribbean.com, Inc.," shows the importance and weight that
the Zippo scale is given in the personal jurisdiction analysis.38 In
Caldwell, the district court found that the Web site ran by the
defendant offered a high degree of interactivity because it allowed
customers to book vacations through the Web site and that contacts
derived through the Web site with Michigan residents had been on-
going for a number of years." The Caldwell decision is notable
because it finds jurisdiction to be proper despite the fact that the
plaintiff did not use the interactive features of the Web site to book
her vacation; the court found the existence of an interactive Web
site is sufficient to show purposeful availment.40
Caldwell is just one example of how inconsistently the Zippo
test has been applied and illustrates the unpredictable results that
can occur from this inconsistency." Another case in which a
federal district court applies the Zippo test is ICG Am., Inc. v. Wine
the Zippo test); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707,
714 (4th Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1999); see, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002) ("This
circuit has drawn upon the approach of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc. in determining whether the operation of an internet site can support
the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction."); ALS
Scan, 293 F.3d at 713 ("[W]e adopt today the model developed in Zippo .... ).
37 Caldwell v. Cheapcaribbean.com, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-13828, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93200, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2010). In Caldwell, plaintiff went on
defendant's Web site to view vacation accommodations and eventually ordered
cruise tickets via a toll-free number posted on the Web site. Id. at *3.
3 Id. at *17-19.
39 Id. at *20. In describing the nature of the Web site:
There is evidence before the Court that during the time frame from
January, 2006 to November 2009, up to 1% [of] Cheap Caribbean's
total number of bookings were made by Michigan residents. While this
constitutes only a small portion of Cheap Caribbean's overall business,
these repeated commercial contacts with Michigan residents over a
number of years constituted a conscious choice by Cheap Caribbean to
conduct business with the residents of the state of Michigan.
Id.
40 Id. at *23.
41 Id. at *22 (noting that the defendants argue that the Web site merely allows
users to reserve third-party travel services).
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of the Month Club, Inc.42 In ICG, plaintiff sold wine, beer,
chocolates, and other goods to consumers using the phone and the
Internet through its Web site.43 Plaintiff sued for a declaratory
judgment over the status of defendant's alleged trademark for
"wine of the month club."" The ICG court applied Zippo and gave
significant weight to the sliding scale: "Because Defendant's
website sells its products, Defendant's website is interactive and
commercial."45 In finding the defendant's Web site to be
interactive, the court did not lend credence to the small fraction of
sales conducted in Connecticut.46 While the Zippo test attempted
to try and clarify the relationship of personal jurisdiction to the
Internet, as the Internet has become more popular and more
complicated, the Zippo sliding scale has proven unwieldy.4 7
42 ICG Am., Inc. v. Wine of the Month Club, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-133 (PCD),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77151 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2009).
43 Id. at *3.
4 Id. at *2-5 ("This dispute concerns whether Plaintiff may continue to
advertise the monthly wine products selections it offers on its Web sites using
the phrases 'wine of the month club' and 'wine of the month' . . . Defendant is
the record owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,500,846 for the mark:
WINE OF THE MONTH CLUB, registered for 'mail order services in
distribution of wine,' the record owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No.
2,881,828 for the mark: WINE OF THE MONTH CLUB, registered for
'newsletters pertaining to food and drink,' and the record owner of U.S.
Trademark Registration No. 1,246,348 for the mark: WINE OF THE MONTH,
registered for 'newsletters pertaining to food and drink."' (citations omitted)).
45 Id. at *11.
46 Id. at * 11- 13. The Court noted the evidence in the case:
Plaintiff estimates Defendant's Connecticut-related sales to be
approximately $18,000 per year, which is one quarter of one percent of
the low end of Defendant's estimated yearly revenues of $7.2 million to
$9.5 million .... In any case, the dollar amount of Defendant's
Connecticut sales is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question.
Courts have found that a defendant's website, if it is active like the one
in question here, need not produce significant dollar sales from forum
residents in order for the court to find purposeful availment.
Id. (citing Divicino v. Polaris Indus., 129 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434 (D. Conn. 2001);
Broad. Mktg. Int'l, Ltd. v. Prosource Sales & Mktg., 345 F. Supp.2d 1053, 1062
(D. Conn. 2004); Stomp, Inc. v. Neato, LLC, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D.Cal.
1999)).
47 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-24
(1997) (fashioning a personal jurisdiction standard to the Internet); Dunham,
FALL 2010]1 237
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III. CHLOE V. QUEEN BEE OFBEVERLYHILLS, LLC
The Queen Bee decision addresses personal jurisdiction over
Internet businesses, an area of the law that lacks a consistent and
effective standard for approaching personal jurisdiction issues.48
Chloe, a high-end fashion house with a presence in Europe, Asia,
and North America,4 9 was the plaintiff in Queen Bee." Products
manufactured by Chloe, including women's clothing and
accessories, have a reputation for superior quality, are compared to
brands such as Gucci and Burberry," and generally retail at high
price points.52 The defendant in this case, Queen Bee of Beverly
Hills, LLC, operated a Web site where users could purchase
handbags purportedly manufactured by name-brand designers,
including Chloe." The Web site allowed customers to pay for the
orders online using PayPal,54 and Queen Bee offered to ship
handbags anywhere in the continental United States." In
supra note 5, at 573 ("In fact, the scale itself has led to more confusion as courts
try to comprehensively wedge Internet-based contacts questions into the
inadequate and poorly structured scale. . . .".
48 See Dunham, supra note 5, at 560 (arguing that an approach taken by many
courts, the Zippo sliding scale, has caused personal jurisdiction analysis to stray
from its foundation); see also Zombeck v. Amada Co. Ltd., No. 06-953, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84563, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2007) (describing how a
Web site lacking commercial Internet activity is deemed a passive Web site
without considering whether there was purposeful availment in the traditional
sense of the forum state).
49 CHLOE, http://www.chloe.com/#/home/en (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
' Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 161 (2d. Cir.
2010).
51 Wendy Donahue, This Season's For the Ladies, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-26/features/sc-fash-1004-fall-trends-
edited-20100926_1_burberry-jacket-hermes.
52 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 162.
5 Id.; see David E. Sorkin, Payment Methods For Consumer-To-Consumer
Online Transactions, 35 AKRON L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2001) (explaining that PayPal
is a leading online payment service in which the seller and buyer transact a sale
where the seller never sees the buyer's credit card or bank account number, and
where the parties can choose what information to disclose). Paypal's Web site is
located at: https://www.paypal.com/. See also QUEEN BEE OF BEVERLY HILLS,
http://www.queenbeeotbeverlyhills.com/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
54 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 162.
5 Id.
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December 2005, at the direction of an attorney, an administrative
assistant at Chloe's law firm placed an order through Queen Bee's
Web site for a handbag to be sent to her in New York; the handbag
which arrived was discovered to be a counterfeit. 6
The defendant in Queen Bee sold counterfeit Chloe handbags
for $1,200-$400 dollars below the average retail price of authentic
Chloe handbags. Additionally, the counterfeiters shipped their
goods from Huntsville, Alabama, and Beverly Hills, where they
also had showrooms." During the course of its business, Queen
Bee sold at least thirty-eight other Chloe bags across the country
and made approximately fifty-two sales of non-Chloe products in
New York."
Chloe filed a complaint in New York alleging violations of the
Trademark Act of 1946.59 This Act states, in part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
commerce. any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive; . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the
registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the
acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.60
56 Id.; see also Shawn Mowry, Part One: The Common Law, the States, and
Historical Perspective: California Penal Laws: Mark Abuse, 19 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 47, 52 (2010) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 350(e)(3)'s definition of
counterfeit as "a spurious mark that is identical with, or confusingly similar to, a
registered mark and is used, or intended to be used, on or in connection with the
same type of goods or services for which the genuine mark is registered.").
57 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 162.
58 Id at 163. Chloe first became aware of Queen Bee when it obtained
documents arising out of a separate action against a distinct internet vendor
located in Naperville, Illinois. Id. at 162. The vendor from this separate action
had identified Queen Bee as its supplier; this action occurred in mid-December
2005. Id
59 Id. at 163.
60 15 U.S.C § 1114(1) (2006).
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With the rapid growth of Internet businesses, the law needs a
standard built on structure and reason; otherwise, problems will
continue to arise as courts struggle with addressing personal
jurisdiction concerns in the Internet commerce context. There was
a time when the Internet's rapid growth and ground-breaking
nature led some to believe that it would not be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the traditional meaning, but that a completely novel
standard would have to be formulated to fit such an extraordinary
medium.6 1
IV. QUEENBEE'S TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit in Queen Bee chose not to follow the Zippo
sliding scale analysis and instead applied the more traditional
personal jurisdiction test discussed earlier. The court's personal
jurisdiction analysis began with an investigation of the defendant's
contacts with the state of New York.62 Queen Bee's Web site
permitted New York consumers to purchase counterfeit Chloe
handbags, and then Queen Bee shipped those bags into the state."
Additionally, seized documents indicated the defendants made
sales in New York both through their Web site and in a variety of
"trunk shows."64 The court found that Queen Bee had contacts
with New York, in part, on the basis of more than fifty sales of
designer handbags into the state.65  The Second Circuit applied
traditional guidelines of personal jurisdiction to determine whether
the New York courts had jurisdiction over Queen Bee, an Alabama
6 See Logue, supra note 5, at 1214 (stating that while personal jurisdiction is
tied to concepts of territoriality, interaction in cyberspace is not subject to such
boundaries).
62 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 166.
63 Id.
6 Id. (noting that an exhibit showed the occurrence of fifty-two separate
transactions in which the defendants shipped their merchandise into New York);
see also Valjean Mfg. Inc. v. Michael Werdiger, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6185 (H1B),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2139, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2005) (describing a
"trunk show" as an event where a salesperson travels to a retailer with a trunk of
goods that the retailer does not normally sell).
65 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 167 (noting that the sale of many handbags over
time and not simply one transaction led to the conclusion that defendant had
purposefully directed its activities at New York consumers).
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corporation. In Queen Bee, Chloe alleged specific jurisdiction
over the defendant.66
After considering the defendant's contacts, the court turned to
New York's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. 67 The
state's long-arm statute permits jurisdiction when the defendant
"transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to
supply goods or services in the state." 8 In the first part of the Due
Process analysis, the Second Circuit found sufficient minimum
contacts because Queen Bee sold bags to New York consumers
and because they offered bags for sale on their Web site.69 The
reasonableness inquiry that the court conducted determined
whether jurisdiction over Queen Bee would follow the five factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Asahi.70 Finding that personal
jurisdiction was reasonable in New York, the court explained that
the convenience of modem technology lessened the burden of
litigating in a distant forum and the forum state had a "manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents."'
Applying the more traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, the
Second Circuit found that the long-arm statute was applicable, that
there were sufficient contacts, and that New York's personal
jurisdiction over Queen Bee was reasonable.7 2
66 Id. at 164.
67 Id. at 169-173.
68 Id. at 169 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (2010); see also Kreutter v.
McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y. 1988) (claiming that section 302
[of the long-arm statute] "is a 'single act statute' and proof of one transaction in
New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never
enters New York, so long as the defendant's activities here were purposeful and
there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim
asserted.").
69 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 171.
70 Id. at 173. The factors are "[1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the interests
of the forum State, and [3] the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. It must also
weigh in its determination [4] the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5] the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id.; Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
7 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 173 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 483 (1985)).
72 id
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V. ZIPPo v. QUEEN BEE
A. Problems ofZippo
In Queen Bee, the Second Circuit takes a bold step away from
applying the Zippo scale and instead uses a more traditional
framework to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with precedent." Using the fundamentals of personal
jurisdiction in deciding Queen Bee has its advantages over an
approach that is "tailored" to changes in technology, as Zippo
purports to do.74 Developing a novel standard that captures the
nuances and problems of personal jurisdiction that the Internet
presents is extremely difficult." The ever-changing nature of the
Internet means that the appropriate standard for finding personal
jurisdiction must have the flexibility to accommodate this change
while also having a foundation or basis in relied-upon precedent.
Although many courts have embraced the Zippo sliding scale,
there are a number of problems associated with the standard." The
Zippo scale fails to offer any real guidance when the degree of
" See id at 169-173 (discussing the application of New York's long-arm
statute and then applying the Constitution's Due Process Clause to determine
whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would be proper). Indeed,
the Queen Bee court does not mention Zippo once in its opinion.
74 Dunham, supra note 5, at 573.
7 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to
Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 71, 88 (2006) (noting that underlying Zippo is the flawed presumption that
"the Internet is sufficiently analogous to the conventional stream of commerce
to warrant imposing standards developed for that sphere on the Internet."); see
id. ("[M]any courts espousing Zippo-based approaches have indicated concern
that embracing Internet activity's omnipresence would eliminate all limits on
personal jurisdiction."); infra note 91. But see Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190
F.3d 333, 336-337 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Zippo due to its persuasiveness, but
finding that personal jurisdiction was not sufficient over the defendant because
their Web site merely posted information about its services).
76 See Dunham, supra note 5, at 560 ("The Zippo approach responded to a
rising fear that if entities are able to contact citizens of the forum through the
Internet alone, those contacts will fail the test of minimum contacts because
Internet-based contacts can be disseminated so widely that purposeful availment
with any particular forum is nonexistent.").
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interactivity and contact with a forum is ambiguous." If a Web
site lies in the middle portion of the scale, a defendant is still
required to purposefully direct his activities at the forum in order
for personal jurisdiction to be proper." Another factor pointing to
the Zippo scale's inadequacy lies on the foundations upon which it
is built. In creating a new standard, the Zippo court failed to
actually develop a novel approach to personal jurisdiction
analysis." The court in Zippo places too much weight on its
understanding of the Internet and the Internet's function in
determining personal jurisdiction." The court believes the Zippo
standard was going to govern "this global revolution looming on
the horizon."" Not really knowing what the Internet would bring
in terms of changes in conducting business, the court develops
what it thought to be a flexible and justified sliding scale
standard.82 The Zippo court's approach and its subsequent
application are flawed because they are based on the principle that
Internet activity is so widespread that it is uncontrollable." Instead
of fearing the Internet's ubiquitous nature and placing artificial
limits on where Internet business is directed, the defendant can
n David L. Stott, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional
Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819, 843 (1997) (describing a concern of Zippo analysis
in the middle part of the sliding scale as shown by the fact that many courts have
drawn the line differently in their interpretation of "middle ground" and what
additional activity is needed to provide for the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
78 Dunham, supra note 5, at 575; see Mink, 190 F.3d at 337 (showing that the
court used the Zippo sliding scale but a simple analysis of purposeful availment
would have provided the same result). But see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two,
S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing the Zippo scale as very
influential in shaping jurisdiction analysis over Internet businesses). See
generally S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1999); ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293
F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing several district court opinions and circuit court
decisions, across the nation, which embrace the Zippo approach).
7 Dunham, supra note 5, at 573.
s0 Id. at 569.
81 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo DOT Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
821 Id. at 1124.
83 Spencer, supra note 75, at 71.
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overcome the ubiquity of the Internet by showing the steps it took
to purposefully direct its activities at a specific forum.84
Part of the confusion in applying the Zippo sliding scale to
Internet activities arises because of Zippo's puzzling determination
of whether purposeful availment has occurred." Courts and
litigants often overlook communication between parties via
electronic mail when deciding whether a party established
minimum contacts with a forum." For example, in Dearwater v.
Bond Mfg. Co.," the plaintiff in a wrongful termination suit
acquired a job through a series of emails in response to
advertisements on Craigslist and CareerBuilder.com." Instead of
asserting contact through electronic mail, the plaintiffs argument
relied on its use of job search sites, which are included in the most
interactive end of the Zippo scale.89 The court used the Web site
interaction as a basis to assert that jurisdiction over the defendant
was proper."o Also, courts that place too much weight on the Zippo
scale add to the uncertainty because they ignore evidence, such as
placing products into the stream of commerce, which may show
purposeful availment.9 1 Amid the confusion that the Zippo scale's
84 Id. at 88 (noting how, under a traditional analysis, courts would additionally
be required to determine whether the Internet activity in question meets the
reasonableness requirements of the Due Process Clause).
85 Dunham, supra note 5, at 576.
86 Id.
87 Dearwater v. Bond Mfg. Co., No. 1:06-CV-154, 2007 WL 2745321 (D. Vt.
Sept. 19, 2007).
88 Id. at 1. The Web site addresses for Craigslist and CareerBuilder.com are
http://craigslist.org/ and http://www.careerbuilder.com/.
89 Dearwater, 2007 WL 2745321, at *7.
90 Id
91 See George Kessel Int'l, Inc. v. Classic Wholesales, Inc., No. CV-07-323-
PHX-SMM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83261, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 2007)
(holding that the defendant's Web site was on one end of the sliding scale as a
passive Web site but ignoring other communications between the parties that
had the potential to establish purposeful availment between the parties); Roberts
v. Paulin, No. 07-CV-13207, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80490, at *4-6 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 31, 2007) (applying the Zippo scale and saying the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was proper based on the amount of revenues
procured from the forum, despite the defendant's lack of commercial contact and
purposeful direction of activities at the forum). Courts also apply the Zippo
scale in instances where the Web site in question is not commercial in nature.
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adoption has caused, partly by its failure to comprehend the
complexities that arise in its application, courts are left wondering
what standard to apply.9 2
B. Why Queen Bee is Better
1. Doctrinal Stability
Queen Bee has a solid foundation by virtue of its analysis of
Internet contacts within the traditional personal jurisdiction
framework." The Second Circuit did what many commentators
have suggested by viewing Internet business transactions using
traditional principles;94 the court considers the defendant's Web
site interactions with New York in conjunction with the shipment
of handbags into New York." In other words, the fact that Queen
Bee has a Web site is the starting point of the analysis, but not the
end. The court looks at the manner in which the Web site directs
activity towards New York-by having bags shipped into the
forum from Beverly Hills-as part of the totality of the defendant's
contacts with the state.96
See, e.g., Chi. Architecture Found. v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76226, at *1 (N.D. 111. Oct. 12, 2007) (viewing the defendant's Web site,
a illegal portal intended to steal the plaintiffs Web site hits, within the Zippo
scale despite having no evidence of any commercial traffic between the plaintiff
and defendant). Id at *5.
92 See Dunham, supra note 5, at 573-74 (noting that while some courts have
adopted the Zippo scale in its various forms, other courts are more cautious in
their approach).
93 See Spencer, supra note 75, at 104 (describing how the requirements of
traditional principles of personal jurisdiction analysis apply to contacts arising
out of Internet activity).
94 See Dunham, supra note 5, at 578-79 ("The core of place theory is the
understanding that for a defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction within
the forum, the defendant must have some contact with the territory of the
forum."); see also Spencer, supra note 75, at 104 ("[U]ntil Congress or the
Supreme Court indicates that traditional analysis deserves alteration in the
Internet context, courts should apply traditional principles.").
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The Queen Bee analysis replaces the ambiguous personal
jurisdiction concepts from Zippo," such as the interactivity of a
Web site, with traditional principles of personal jurisdiction, such
as purposeful availment and a substantial connection with the
forum." When a jurisdictional framework uses longstanding
concepts such as minimum contacts in its analysis, courts have a
large body of law to help guide them through the decision-making
process.9 9 With well-developed precedent to guide them, courts
can easily adapt their decisions to meet the demands of a changing
world, such as those found in cases involving Internet
businesses.'oo
2. Flexibility in the Traditional Approach
Queen Bee also provides for an accommodating, in terms of
variation in fact patterns, approach, and the decision serves to
effectively limit how far personal jurisdiction is exercised over
Internet businesses. One way in which the impact of using a
traditional approach to address personal jurisdiction issues
improves the analysis is the flexibility it offers courts in
considering relevant facts when deciding the issue of personal
jurisdiction. A personal jurisdiction analysis is necessarily a fact-
intensive inquiry as courts look at the details of business
transactions to determine whether jurisdiction is proper in a
particular forum.'o' An established analytical approach can be
9 Spencer, supra note 75, at 87 (arguing that interactivity has little or no
relevance to whether the conduct at issue, which may include commercial
activity or the misuse of intellectual property, has any impact on the issue of
purposeful availment).
98 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 171-73.
9 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877) ("Construing this latter
provision to mean, that, in an action for money or damages where a defendant
does not appear in the court, and is not found within the State, and is not a
resident thereof, but has property therein, the jurisdiction of the court extends
only over such property, the declaration expresses a principle of general, if not
universal, law.").
100 See Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 173 (describing how the court is able to easily
integrate its analysis of the Web site sales into its determination of purposeful
availment of the defendant).
1o1 Jayne S. Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L.
REv. 627, 655 (2009).
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easily utilized by a court and its historical grounding provides a
means to address various societal changes.O2 A court is able to use
the historical record to improve upon and benefit from the
decisions of prior adjudications.
In Queen Bee, the Second Circuit establishes that a personal
jurisdiction analysis using traditional principles is flexible and can
accommodate changes in technology.o3 The approach taken in
Queen Bee uses a core concept, purposeful availment of a
particular forum, and applies it to electronic communication and
Internet commerce.'" An analytical framework, such as that used
in Zippo, is unnecessary and indeed counterproductive when
purposeful availment is effectively applied to Internet contacts.'o
Purposeful availment is measured by the number of instances or
the manner in which one party reaches out to another.' If a
defendant purposefully directs activities at a forum when shipping
a handbag, then the same defendant purposefully directs activities
by making Internet sales to residents of the forum.o' Although the
methods of communication have become more technologically
advanced, the concept remains the same. The Queen Bee personal
jurisdiction analysis properly uses traditional principles to
determine whether the Internet business-defendant purposefully
avails itself of the forum. "
102 Id.
103 See Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 166-67 (explaining how sales by Queen Bee,
through trunk sales and its Web site, reflect the defendant's purposeful
availment of New York); see also Dunham, supra note 5, at 580 ("The issue of
purposeful availment has been measured in the modem context of remote
communications, such as facsimile transmissions, telephone calls, mail order
business, and other devices of commercial communication that allow parties to
develop contacts without travel to the forum. When the framework relies on
purposeful contacts to assess jurisdiction, it is able to adapt with technology.").
104 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 167.
los But see Carlos J.R. Salvado, An Effective Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
for the Internet, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 75, 103 (2003) (indicating that
the Zippo case has been cited positively by a variety of different courts).
06 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,474-75 (1985).
107 Dunham, supra note 5, at 559, 580.
'08 Id. at 580-81. See generally id. at 578 ("Devices now as commonplace as
electronic mail were differentiated from posted mail and telephone calls because
of electronic mail's remoteness and inability to place persons in live contact
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
3. Queen Bee's Guidance
Queen Bee is valuable for the direction it gives to other courts
in handling cases involving personal jurisdiction and Internet
contacts. Simply by employing an analysis involving traditional
personal jurisdiction principles, the Second Circuit is implicitly
rejecting the Zippo sliding scale and providing a framework for
other courts to use.'" By clearly stating the steps required to
determine whether New York had jurisdiction over Queen Bee, the
court provides a guiding light in an area of the law that has been
fractured by divergent opinions."o
VI. LIMITING PRINCIPLES
Queen Bee's constitutional check of personal jurisdiction is a
useful and valuable tool for courts to employ in evaluating the
fairness of exercising jurisdiction in particular circumstances. A
criticism of the traditional personal jurisdiction analysis employed
in Queen Bee is that the Internet is ubiquitous, and permitting
Internet contacts to fulfill the purposeful availment requirement
would force people who placed information on the Internet to be
with another ... The early decisions identified the issue of Internet-based
contacts as matters of first impression, distinct from the traditional personal
jurisdiction case."); Anindita Dutta, I. Intellectual Property: C. Trademark: 2.
Personal Jurisdiction: a) Minimum Contacts: Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 300 (1998) (recounting that
the Zippo court compared information passing over the Internet to a driver of a
vehicle driving through different states and how this analogy was not very
helpful; "A car is a physical entity that is completely within the control of the
driver. Conversely, information on the Web is not tangible or even visible until
downloaded onto a computer, and even then the user never knows exactly what
server or access provider brought the information to her.").
109 See Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 164 (describing the standard, the minimum
contacts and reasonableness inquiry, which the court uses).
no Dunham, supra note 5, at 577 (describing how Zippo's sliding scale is not
based on traditional personal jurisdiction principles). See generally George
Kessel Int'l, Inc. v. Classic Wholesales, Inc., No. CV-07-323-PHXSMM, 2007
WL 3208297, at *5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 30, 2007) (using the fact that the defendant's
Web site was passive as dispositive of the issue of personal jurisdiction instead
of looking at more traditional commercial activities that may have established
purposeful availment).
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subject to personal jurisdiction in every state."' However, this
concern is unfounded because there is a constitutional check built
into the traditional approach to limit such "universal
jurisdiction."l 2 This is the reasonableness requirement that is part
of the Due Process inquiry."3 The factors from Asahi will
necessarily limit the scope of where the exercise of jurisdiction is
proper.1 4  For example, when a state has little interest in the
outcome of a dispute because the essence of state policies are not
at stake, jurisdiction over the defendant may prove to be
unreasonable."' This constitutional check would prevent a
company that ships products to every state from being subject to a
lawsuit in every state.
The court in Queen Bee uses a second tool of personal
jurisdiction analysis to effectively limit the "universal jurisdiction"
problem. In its opinion, the Second Circuit "look[s] to the totality
of Defendants' contacts with the forum state.""' By viewing the
11 ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th
Cir. 2002); see also Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV.
521, 529 (2003) (arguing that anyone with a Web site would be able to be sued
anywhere in the country because they have sent their "product" into every
forum); Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2003) ("In fact,
faithful application of the usual test for personal jurisdiction arguably leads to
the conclusion that maintaining a Web site constitutes purposeful availment of
every state in the country. This phenomenon threatens to render the purposeful
availment prong meaningless when Internet activities serve as the relevant
contacts with the forum state.").
112 Spencer, supra note 75, at 104.
"13 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 173.
114 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
"1 Spencer, supra note 75, at 106 (describing another situation where plaintiff
has no relationship with the forum and, combined with defendant's lack of
connection with the forum outside of Internet contacts, jurisdiction may be
unreasonable). But see id. at 107 (arguing that the reasonableness test of the
Due Process inquiry permits judges to reach widely divergent decisions, thus
undermining predictability and positing that reasonableness is not an effective
check on limiting jurisdiction).
116 Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 165 (citing Grand River Enters. Six Nations Ltd. v.
Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2005)) ("No single event or contact
connecting defendant to the forum state need be demonstrated; rather, the
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
defendants' contacts as a whole, the court limits the weight that a
lone Internet transaction, for example, has in determining whether
jurisdiction is proper."' In this vein, the Second Circuit determines
that the shipment of fifty-two items into New York combined with
trunk show sales made jurisdiction in New York permissible."'
Finally, the Second Circuit considers whether these contacts were
intentional. Only if the contacts are intentionally availed to that
location will personal jurisdiction be found, and in Queen Bee, the
contacts were intentional."'
VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Chloe v. Queen Bee of
Beverly Hills, LLC is a return to a personal jurisdiction analysis
utilizing traditional principles. Queen Bee is unique in that it is
employing traditional principles of personal jurisdiction in an
arena, Internet businesses, that is a shifting frontier and relatively
new in its growth. The traditional framework for determining
personal jurisdiction is well-equipped to handle the complexities
the Internet presents. As shown by the Second Circuit's analysis,
the conventional test is superior to the Zippo sliding scale because
it offers flexibility in accommodating various fact patterns,
provides valuable limitations to the exercise of jurisdiction, and
provides a model for other courts. Courts should adopt the
approach from Queen Bee and stop utilizing the Zippo standard.
Personal jurisdiction over Internet businesses is a developing field
in the law, and Queen Bee adds a decision to the body of law that
is consistent and linear rather than one that is fractured and
confusing. The law and judges need not customize the personal
jurisdiction doctrine to technological changes associated with the
Internet; the traditional framework is well-established and flexible
enough to accommodate advances in the technology frontier.
totality of all defendant's contacts with the forum state must indicate that the
exercise of jurisdiction would be proper.").
1" Queen Bee, 616 F.3d at 165.
" Id. at 166.
"9 See Logue, supra note 5, at 1252 (noting that limiting personal jurisdiction
to instances in which the defendant intentionally creates contacts with the forum
helps ensure that people are not subject to jurisdiction anywhere in the world).
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